The simultaneous operation of per case and per service payment systems in Maryland, and the varying levels of stringency used in setting per case rates allows comparison of effects of differing incentive structures on hospital costs. This paper presents such a cothparison with 1977-1981 data. Cost per case and total cost regressions show evidence of lower costs only when per case payment limits are very stringent. Positive net revenue incentives appear insufficient to induce reductions in length of stay and in ancillary services use. Our results suggest these changes in medical practice patterns are more likely under the threat of financial losses.
Procedures and Incentives Under Per Service Payment
Per service rates were set prospectively by the HSCRC each
year on the basis of budgeted volumes and costs in routine care, special care, and ancillary patient service centers. After rates were set in an initial round of detailed rate reviews (involving examination of hospitals' financial data and comparisons with peer institutions), they were trended forward annually to reflect inflation in factor costs and adjusted for volume variances. When actual revenues in a year exceeded budgeted revenues because service volumes were higher than projected, variable cost factors of .6 for routine services and .4 for ancillary services were applied to the excess revenue to determine how much of the excess the hospital was permitted to retain. An incremental variable cost factor of .7 was applied to revenues due to equivalent admissions (i.e., admissions adjusted for outpatient activity) more than 2 per cent above the projected level. This factor increased to .8 for revenues due to actual equivalent admissions more than -3-10 per cent above projected.
When actual revenues fell short of budgeted because of volume variances, a variable cost factor of .2 was applied to determine the unrecovered fixed costs to be included in the next year's rates. If a hospital also experienced a shortfall of more than 5 per cent from projected to actual equivalent admissions, the incremental variable cost factor increased to .6 and .4 for routine care and ancillary cost services respectively. 4 The asymmetry between the upward and downward variable cost factors was intended to encourage reductions in unnecessary utilization.5
By trending forward the initially-approved rates and rarely using detailed rate reviews after the initial round, the "regulatory lag" of the HSCRC system was fairly long. This influenced incentives in that net revenue gains from increased efficiency (i.e., lower unit costs after adjustments for volume variances) would continue to accrue to the hospital over a long period of time (until rates were readjusted to actual costs in another detailed rate review).
fUR Payments and Incentives
Per service rates were set for all hospitals (including the fUR hospitals) and were the basis for generating bills to individual patients or third-party payors. The GIR program superimposed on this process a projected case-mix-adjusted revenue cap per case for live discharges. If a GIR hospital realized an actual revenue per case below (above) its cap, it received additional (reduced) revenues, via higher (lower) rates in the next year, equal to the -4relevant variable cost factor times the number of live discharges times the difference between the cap and actual revenue per case.
For example, suppose a hospital's actual revenue exceeded its projected revenue and its overall variable cost factor was approximately .5. If its case-mix-adjusted average revenue per case was $500 below its GIR cap, and it had 5,000 live discharges, it received $500 x 5,000 x .5 or $1,250,000 in additional allowable revenue in next year's rates.
The purpose of the GIR program was to create incentives to reduce length of stay and use of ancillary services. It is possible, however, that it also encouraged increased admissions.
For instance, if a GIR hospital reduced its length of stay and ancillary revenues per case by 5 per cent but simultaneously increased its admissions by 5 per cent, so that its actual charges were about equal to its projected charges, it would receive a GIR "bonus" equal to 3.1 per cent of total revenues.6 Moreover, if simultaneously decreasing length of stay and ancillary care per case and increasing admissions in the same proportion has little effect on costs, the 3.1 per cent GIR bonus is added to net revenue. A per service hospital experiencing the same situation would receive no net revenue bonus at all.
In most cases, the GIR cap level was derived from the hospital's own charges during a base period of its choosing. For this period, live discharges (excluding newborns) were grouped according to a case-mix classification and average charge per case for each group was computed. Adjustment of these average charges for rate chares between the base and current periods yielded current period average charges which were then applied to the hospital's current period frequency distribution of live discharges by group to determine its current period GIlt level.
In three instances, however, hospitals were judged by the HSCRC to have excessively high costs per case and were placed on an externally-determined percase revenue cap that was below their historical experience. For these three hospitals, which we shall term CAP hospitals, all of the excess of average charge per case above the cap was deducted from next year's rates while savings below the cap were not added to next year's rates or to next year's cap. Thus, the main effect of reducing length of stay or ancillary use was to reduce losses. Bonus payments were not made for beating the cap. Of course, reductions in case-mix costliness were also encouraged since the cap for these hospitals was not case-mix-adjusted.
Finally, as in the case of the regular GIlt, additional admissions could offset some of the negative impacts of reduced length-of-stay or ancillary use on total revenues. While the constraint on the CAP hospitals was mandatory, the GIR program was phased in on a voluntary basis beginning in late 1976.
The HSCRC offered several inducements for hospitals to go on the GIR, including an additional 1 per cent inflation allowance and additional administrative expenses for a hospital to monitor its own performance. In some cases, the GIR was offered to hospitals as an alternative to a full review of rates which the HSCRC felt would otherwise have been necessary because of major service additions, expansions, or out-of-line cost perforniance. Measures of inpatient cost, and of its two components -routine and ancillary service costs, are used as our dependent variables.
Two different types of regression models are employed. First, efficiency impacts of the CUR are estmiatccl ithin the context of a technological cost function relating cost to the volume and mix of output, input prices, and fixed inputs (capital-stock measures).
Second, we estimate behavioral cost regressions whose specificatjo is based on a standard short-run model of hospital decision-making.9
The hospital decision-makers are presumed to choose variable input quantities and output prices so as to maximize an objective function subject to a downward-sloping product demand curve, technology, input price, and fixed capital constraints. Assuming an interior solution to this maximization process, the resulting optimal level of cost can be related, via the first-order maximization conditions, to the exogenous factors that determine the constraints faced by the hosoital. The regression model presented here may be viewed as an estimate of this relationship. Accordingly, the independent variables included in this inodelpertain to market demand conditions, input prices, and the hospital's fixed capital stock. Output volume and mix variables are endogenous and therefore not included.
The different specifications of these two approaches give rise to different interpretations of the estimated CIR effects.
In the cost function analysis, coefficients for the GIR variables measure the effect of the GIR on efficiency, that is, on the cost of producing any given volume and mix of output. In the behavioral models, since output volume and mix variables are excluded, estimated GIR coefficients reflect both efficiency impacts and the cost implications of GIR impacts on the volume and mix of output.
Definition of Variables
The measure of cost used to define our dependent variables is the reimbursable cost of inpatient services as reported in the Medicare Cost Reports (MCRs) filed annually by the study hospitals. This figure includes: routine cost of adult, pediatric, and nursery inpatient services plus the general service ("overhead't) cost allocated to these services; direct plus allocated overhead costs of intensive care and other special inpatient care units; and the inpatient portion of direct plus allocated overhead costs for ancillary services. The sum of the first two of these components is used as our routine cost dependent variable; the third is our ancillary cost dependent variable°A listing of explanatory variables is given in Table 1 . Among the variables in our technological cost functions, the volume of patient service output is measured by the number of inpatient admissions (ADM) while oUtput mix is measured by a scalar index of case-mix costliness (DRCMIX) described below. The input price measure is the nursing wage level in the area where the hospital is located (NWAGE). Capital-stock variables are bed-days available (BDDYS) (i.e., average bed-complement x 365) and the ratio of special care to total beds (SPECRTO). As a measure of teach5ng activity, we also include the number of approved residency positions per bed in the hospital (POSBED).
In our behavioral cost regressions, explanatory variables include county population characteristics oresumed to influence product-demand conditions (NEDAGE, HSIZE, HINC, PUBASST, and 
GIR Variables
Three pairs of GIR variables were employed (see Table 2 ).
For all hospitals on the GIR for at least six months in a fiscal
year, a GIR duimny variable (GIRSTAT) was set equal to 1.0. The coefficient of this variable measures the one-time cost impact of going on the GIL To allow for the possibility that the initial GIR impact intensified or decayed over time, the length of the time period (in months) during which the hospital was on the GIR (TIME) was included.
Variables were added to allow for differences between teaching and non-teaching hospitals in GIR impacts (i.e., GIRTEACH and TIMTEACH). Such differences might be expected because clinical decisions in teaching hospitals are more likely to rest with physicians who are salaried hospital employees. Administrative control over clinical decision-making patterns may thus be easier to establish in response to CIR incentives to reduce patient stays and ancillary service volumes.
The third pair of variables, also analogous to CIRSTAT and TIME, are CAP and CAPTIME. These are only non-zero for the three hospitals whose per case payment limit was not based on their own past experience because their cost per case figures were deemed excessive. For these hospitals, the per case payment limit imposed a more stringent financial constraint than that experienced by other GIR hospitals, and thus one would expect CAP and CAPTIME to be negatively related to cost.
In addition, to capture any cost impact of going off the CIR systn, the dummy variable ONOFF was set equal to 1.0 for each year in which a previously GIR hospital was off the system. Similarly, CAPOFF = 1 for 198]. for the two hospitals that went off the CAP; otherwise it equals zero.
Functional Forth and Estimation Method
All regressions are estimated with the dependent and continuous independent variables entered in logarithmic form. Exceptions are POSBED, SPECRTO, TIME, TINTEACH and CAPTIME which are entered in linear form because of zero values for many data points.
To control for possible correlation of regression disturbances for the same hospital over time, we have employed the fixed-effects method of least-squares regression with pooled data. This method involves the inclusion of dummy variables for each hospital in the sample (save one if a constant term is also included). Coefficient estimates obtained with this metho.d will not be biased by omitted hospital-specific characteristics that are stable over the study period. This is important in that these hospital charactens tics may have been correlated with the GIR variable (since hospitals were not randomly selected for the GIR program). Bear in mind, however, that this method does not take into account autocorrelation due to auto-regressive disturbances, and that it is somewhat inefficient since any information from cross-sectional variation is not used in estimating the regression coefficients.
Thus, it is a rather conservative method of measuring dR effects in the sense that it will tend to yield less significant coefficient estimates than other methods which are more susceptible to omitted variable biasJ4
Cost Function Results
Estimated cost functions with CTIRSTAT, TINE, and ONOFF included to capture overall average CUR effects are shown in Table 315 In these results, none of tne three CUR variables ever approaches reasonable levels of statistical significance.
Thus, when the number of admissions, case mix, and other factors are controlled statistically, CUR hospitals did not incur significantly lower costs than those paid under the per service systems. Coefficients of other independent variables are generally significant and have the exnected signs. The case-mix index has the expected positive sign but is not significant; this is not surprising in our fixed-effects model since case-mix does not vary much from year to year within a single hospital. It is also interesting to observe that the POSBED result implies a cost differential of about 4.5 per cent between a hospital with no residency programs and one with 0.1 residentsper bed. This differential is close to the official HCFA estimate of 5.79 per cent that was doubled to arrive at the indirect teaching cost adjustment in the current version of the Medicare PPS regulations.16
While the three GIR variables in Table 3 did not show any significant overall average GIR effects, regressions including other CUR variables suggested differences in the CUR among our study hospitals. When each of the eight GIR variables was entered as the only CUR variable in our inpatient, routine, and ancillary cost function regressions, significant negative coefficients (one-tailed PC 0.1) were obtained for CAPTIME in an inpatient cost regression (coefficient = -0.00165,. P = 0.0492) and a routine cost regression (coefficient = -0.00168, P = 0.0608), and for CAP in a routine cost regression (coefficient = -0.06654, P = 0.0460)) Since CAPTINE is measured in months, these CAPTIME coefficients imply a yearly rate of cost increase for CAP hospitals which is about 2 per cent below the rate for other hospitals. The routine cost result with CAP, rather than CAPTIME, implies a 6.4 per cent lower level of costs for CAP hospitals.
As is shown in the first two columns of Table 4 , the CAPTIME coefficient in the inpatient cost function remained strongly negative when other GIR variables entered (though inclusion of CAP reduced its size and significance). The GIRSTAT and TIME results in these regressions suggest a negative initial CUR effect balanced by a more rapid rate of cost increase subsequently.
(Magnitudes of the coefficients imply that the two effects exactly cancel at TIME = 23 months.) This is consistent with the extra 1 per cent in the inflation adjustment for GIR hospitals. On the other hand, the GIRTEACH and TINTEACH coefficients almost exactly offset the GIRSTAT and TIME coefficients implying essentially no GIR effect on teaching hospitals.
Stepwise inclusion of additional GIR variables in the routine cost regressions (columns 3, 4 and 5 of Table 4 ) does not markedly change the CAP and CAPTIME results but the negative CAPOFF coefficient (which is only slightly smaller than the CAP coefficient) implies that routine cost savings of being on the.
CAP were not reversed immediately when CAP hospitals went onto the standard GIR system. The pattern of significant and offsetting coefficients for GIRSTAT vs. GIRTEACH and TIME vs.
TIMTEACH was much weaker in the routine cost regresssions.
This pattern re-emerged very clearly in the ancillary cost regressions (columns 6 and 7 of Table 4 ) while the negative effects for the CAP variables were again somewhat weaker than in the total inpatient or routine cost analyses.
In summary, our results indicate (1) a negative cost impact of being on the CAP primarily stemming from lower routine costs and (2) a negative initial GIR cost effect for non-teaching hospitals which decays over time and which is seen mainly in the ancillary cost areas.
Results for Behavioral Cost Rejression
Coefficients for GIRSTAT, TIME and ONOFF are larger ard more significant in our behavioral cost regressions (Table 5) than in the technological cost functions reported above; however none of the two-tailed P-values for those coefficients are less than 0.1. With total inpatient cost as the dependent variable, we obtain a negative initial GIR impact which decays over time Results when all eight GIR variables were allowed to enter stepwise are shown in Table 6 . Results for the total inpatient cost regressions (columns 1-3) are similar to the corresponding cost function results (Table 4 • columns 1 and 2) except that CAP is more strongly negative than CAPTIME. In the cost per case regressions in Table 6 (columns 4 and 5), the negative CAPTIME -17coefficient is more significant while the pattern of offsetting coefficients for GIRSTAT vs. GIRTEACH and TIME vs. TIMTEACH is weaker and the negative GIRSTAT coefficient is much smaller.21
Results for behavioral cost regressions with ancillary costs and routine costs as the dependent variables (not shown) paralleled the cost function results (in Table 4 ) in two respects.
First, the pattern of offsetting GIRSTAT vs. CIRTEACH and TIME vs.
TINTEACH coefficients was only evident in the ancillary cost regressions; second, the CAP and CAPTIME results are generally weaker than in the total cost regressions, with only the negative CAP coefficient in the routine cost regression nearing conventional statistical significance levels. The same observations apply to routine and ancillary cost per case regressions with two exceptions: in both regressions CAPTIME is strongly negative and in the ancillary cost per case regression the positive CIRTEACH coefficient is clearly larger and more significant than the negative GIRSTAT coefficient. (Results of these regressions are available on request from the authors.)
Summary and ConclUsthns
Based on the generally weak results for our GIR variables and the strong negative results for CAPTIME in our cost function and behavioral cost per case regressions, the major conclusion which emerges from our study is that GIR impacts on cost per case were only significant for those hospitals in which the per case payment level was set in a very stringent manner (i.e. the CAP hospitals). While other GIR hospitals could have increased their net revenues by responding more vigorously to the GIR incentives, it appears from our findings that the risk of losses (to CAP hospitals) was a more powerful inducement to cost control. Since almost all study hospitals (including all GIR hospitals) were non-profit institutions, this conclusion should not be too surprising. When the form of ownership restricts the use of net revenues, the motivation to increase profits is presumably attenuated. This seems especially likely when the opportunities to increase profits involve changes in treatment practices (i.e., length of stay, use of ancillary services) over which hospital management has less direct control.
Another factor contributing to this result may be the existence of regulatory cost restraints; the incentive to accumulate retained earnings for reinvestment in expanded or more sophisticated services and facilities is weakened by the realization that regulators may be reluctant to approve higher rates to cover additional service costs. In short, as an inducement to efficiency the "stick" appears to have been mightier than the "carrot." 22
It is also of interest that the negative impact of the CAP on cost was somewhat stronger for routine patient care rather than ancillary services.23 This may be an indication that hospital management has greater control over the costs of nursing care than ancillary service costs, or that treatment decisions regarding length of stay are more susceptible to management influence than are decisions about specific diagnostic and therapeutic procedures. A third possible explanation is that certain overhead costs have been more susceptible to management control and that these costs tend to be allocated primarily to nursing care cost ccnt:ers. Finally, while these results may support more general conclusions about the relative merits of per case and per service payment systems, it is important to take note of factors that may have contributed to these findings. First, when judged by experience in other states, the per service payment system in Maryland appears to be fairly stringent. Thus, the additional incentives to control unit costs under the GIR may have been modest in comparisons with the overall pressures for unit cost control imposed by the system on both GIR and non-GIR hospitals.
Second, the length of time on the GIR for hospitals in the study \lflS fairly f;liort (avernging ii ii tide flyer two years) . Siihsoqucnt non-CAP, teaching vs. non-teaching) and over time, since many of these variables will be strongly correlated with one another.
Our ongoing research with a longer time series of data for
Maryland will hopefully yield more powerful tests and will also allow us to.compare per-case and fixed-budget payment approaches. 19. See note 18. 20. See note 18. 21. The results described in this paragraph were obtained from regressions in which the five least significant independent variables (other than GIR variables) were deleted. These five variables were identified by reestimating the regressions in Table 5 with all GIR variables included. Exclusion of these variables from the regressions reported on here had no material effects on the findings for the GIR variables.
Regression results with all variables included are available on request from the authors. 22. Note the similarity between our conclusion and the argument recently advanced by Fuchs that the ongoing changes nationally in hospital financing will impact on hospital behavior precisely because "there is a real prospect that the hospital will not have enough revenue to cover its costs." See 25. More detailed information on data sources and variable construction is given in Steinwachs and Salkever (notel3 ), Chapters 2 and 3 and Appendices A-C.
